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 Thorsten Faas / Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
The  Difference  Between  Real  And        
Potential Power: Voting Power, Atten-
dance and Cohesion 
 
Introduction 
Applying power indices to the political process of the European Union has 
become fashionable. An increasing range of scholars has applied power 
indices to studying the institutions of the European Union (EU). However, 
their work has not gone without criticism.
1 Critics argue that the use of 
power indices is of little value, since they ignore the preferences of the ac-
tors, such as party groups, and also the political dynamics of the decision-
making processes, such as the EU legislative procedures (see particularly 
Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 1999, Tsebelis and Garrett 1996). Advocates of 
power indices reply by arguing that one cannot know the preferences of the 
relevant actors in all possible contingencies. We do not always know the 
preferences of the actors, but we can still say something meaningful about 
their potential influence (see for example Lane and Berg 1999, Holler and 
Widgrén 1999). 
Initially the power index approach was used in the context of the European 
Union to study the consequences of alternative voting weights and majority  
 
1  Since the arguments have already been exchanged elsewhere (see particularly the special issue of the 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Volume 11 (3), 1999), we can confine ourselves to just briefly pre-
senting the main arguments here. Thorsten Faas/ Tapio Raunio/ Matti Wiberg 
rules in the Council (e.g. Hosli 1995, 1996, Laruelle and Widgrén 1998), 
but subsequent applications have incorporated the Parliament and the 
Commission into their calculations (e.g. Bindseil and Hantke 1997, Co-
lomer and Hosli 2000, Felsenthal and Machover 1997, Hosli 1997, Lane et 
al. 1995, Moberg 1998, Nurmi 1997, Nurmi and Meskanen 1999).  
However, all of these studies are based on two assumptions about legisla-
tive politics in the European Parliament (EP) that do not reflect the actual 
working of the EP accurately. The first assumption is that all members of 
all groups (be they national delegations, national parties or party groups) 
are present in the EP when a vote is taken. The second assumption is that 
all members of each group (again, be they national delegations, national 
parties or party groups) always vote together (i.e. act cohesively).
2  
Bindseil and Handtke (1997: 174) actually do acknowledge this shortcom-
ing of their analysis, stating that „in the special case of a ‘Thomas-Becket-
effect’ being systematically  more frequent among the representatives of 
some member states than of others, the distribution of power [..] would 
shift in favour of those member states with more loyal representatives.” In 
other words, they accept that differential levels of cohesion (and atten-
dance) can cause shifts in the distribution of power in the EP. Nonetheless, 
they regard these scenarios as „special” and consequently – just like other 
scholars – as ignorable. Doing so is questionable, though, since differential 
levels of cohesion and attendance characterise the proceedings in the EP 
and, thus, are closer to the „default” than a „special” case. Hence, they 
should not be ignored in power index analysis. 
This article analyses the distribution of voting power in the 1999-2002 EP, 
taking into account differential levels of attendance and cohesion among 
party groups.  
 
 
2  Precisely stated, the assumptions are that there are no differences in the level of attendance and co-
hesion among the groups. 
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It does so – using the Shapley-Shubik -index
3 (Shapley and Shubik 1954) – 
for two different kinds of votes: First, votes taken under absolute majority 
rule (i.e. a majority of all MEPs is necessary for a proposal to pass), second 
– and this is nowadays the empirically more relevant case – votes taken un-
der simple majority rule (i.e. only a majority of the votes cast is necessary 
for a proposal to pass). However, before we start the actual discussion of 
the distribution of power, a few remarks concerning party groups in the EP 
– and especially their levels of cohesion and attendance – seem appropriate. 
Party Groups in the EP 
Party groups are the backbone of the EP’s internal organization. The larger 
groups like the PES and the EPP accommodate national parties from all 
member states, while one or two national parties often dominate smaller 
groups. Table 1 provides some basic information about party groups in the 
first half of the fifth European Parliament (1999-2002). (See Table 1 in the 
Annex) 
Despite accommodating large numbers of national parties and despite often 
being little more than loose coalitions of national parties, not to mention the 
lack of any EU-level government to support or challenge, previous studies 
about group cohesion in the EP have shown rather high levels of cohesion.
4 
Nonetheless, group cohesion is subject to constant pressure from individual 
MEPs and national parties. Party groups have to accept defections, espe-
 
3  The index is computed by listing all permutations of voters and the relative frequency with which a 
particular voter is in a pivotal position. When using the Shapley-Shubik -index it is assumed that all 
orders of forming coalitions (permutations) are equally probable. The Shapley-Shubik -index for a 
party group is the weighted average of the value this group adds to all possible coalitions. The 
weights are the a priori probabilities of the corresponding coalitions. The Shapley-Shubik -index 
draws our attention to the notion of players who pivot (those who can convert losing coalitions into 
winning coalitions). The Shapley-Shubik -index of a voter i in voting body v (also called a weighted 
voting game) is equal to the number of permutations of N voters in v in which i is pivotal divided by 
n! which is the total number of possible permutations for the game v. Player i is pivotal only if her 
membership turns the losing coalition into a winning coalition. All permutations are taken equally 
likely. Since neither the issues nor the preferences of the actors are specified, we can ascribe by the 
principle of insufficient reason equal probability to any issue and corresponding preference ordering, 
i.e. the permutation of voters. 
4  See Raunio (2002: 266) for a summary of group cohesion in the directly elected Parliament. Hix and 
Lord (1997) and Kreppel (2002) provide excellent accounts of the development and operation of the 
party groups. 
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cially of entire national party delegations. There are several reasons why 
MEPs vote against a party group line – the most prominent being that na-
tional parties expect their MEPs to vote in a certain way, even if that means 
voting against the party group. Such voting instructions are quite effective, 
since the re-selection (and consequently also the re-election) of MEPs de-
pends on the support of a national party. Faas (2002) provides indirect evi-
dence that strongly supports this view. He finds that MEPs from those na-
tional parties that are rather Euro-sceptic, that have a centralised method of 
candidate selection, that invest more resources in the monitoring of their 
MEPs and/or that are part of the national government are more likely to 
defect from party group lines. Obviously, these parties have a higher inter-
est in as well as a more effective tool box for influencing their MEPs’ be-
haviour. This is also reflected in a survey of MEPs conducted in 1996: 
When MEPs were asked, on which source they would be most inclined to 
base their decisions on in controversial matters, national parties ended up in 
second place (on average), while EP party groups ended up only third.
5 So, 
defections do occur, as one senior member of the EPP group also acknowl-
edges: „This happens. This is possible; they can do it. But normally we al-
ways prefer that they do not do it” (quoted in Brzinski 1995: 149). 
The empirical consequences
6 in terms of party group cohesion can be seen 
from Figure 1. Obviously, party groups are characterised by rather high, 
but also by very different levels of cohesion. In line with the results of pre-
vious studies, group cohesion for the four largest party groups in the 1999-
2002 EP is highest, with index scores exceeding 80. The UEN and the 
GUE/NGL groups take middle positions. The anti-integrationist EDD 
group, the non-attached members and the TGI display the lowest level of 
 
5  The first choice of MEPs is their own judgement. The MEP study 1996 was part of the project ”Po-
litical representation in Europe” and can be obtained from the Central Archive in Cologne (study 
number ZA3078). 
6  The data base of the study consists of roll call votes taken in the European Parliament from July 
1999 to February 2002. The details for each roll call (i.e. the voting behavior of individual MEPs) 
were obtained from the minutes of the EP (accessible at 
http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar?APP=PV1&LANGUE=EN). A total of 3050 
roll call votes was taken during this period. They are used as the data base for this analysis. Based on 
these roll call votes, group cohesion was calculated for each roll call and each party group using At-
tinà’s (1990) index of agreement. Attendance was also calculated based on whether MEPs cast their 
vote in a roll call vote or not. 
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cohesion. With that in mind, it seems very questionable to regard cases of 
differential cohesion among party groups as „special”. (See Figures 1 and 2 
in the Annex) 
Concerning attendance, we can observe similar tendencies, although to a 
lesser extent. Apparently (and with the EDD being a major exception), 
members of less cohesive party groups are also less present in the chamber. 
In addition, one can see that all party groups have to cope with about 25 
per cent of their MEPs not being present, posing serious problems for mat-
ters decided under absolute majority rule, when 314 MEPs have to vote in 
favour of a proposal regardless of the number of representatives actually 
present. 
Taken together, we clearly see differential levels of cohesion and atten-
dance in the EP. Moreover, both effects interact, which should considerably 
lower the voting power of affected groups. Finally, these differential levels 
among party groups are quite stable, e.g. they hardly change regardless of 
whether the roll call at stake is on an amendment or a final resolution. 
Hence, it is justified to assume that the observed levels of cohesion and at-
tendance can be treated – at least to a large extent – as exogenous factors 
that influence the legislative process and not vice versa.  
We can assume that each party group has a specific „default” level of at-
tendance and cohesion that is mostly independent from the proceedings in-
side the Parliament. These levels can be included into the a priori consid-
erations of power index analysis, which is the next part of our analysis. 
Voting Power in the EP assuming perfect cohesion and 
attendance 
When analyzing voting power in the fifth European Parliament (1999-
2002), one has to take into account that the TGI group was one of the play-
ers in the EP from June 1999 to September 2001, but was disbanded in Oc-
tober 2001. Since a change in the configuration of players can have consid-
erable consequences for the distribution of power in a game, we will           
analyze both periods separately. The first step in our analysis is the calcula-
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tion of power indices for the Parliament assuming perfect attendance and 
cohesion, as previous power index analysis of the EP have done (Table 2). 
This will yield a point of reference for our further analysis.
7 
The most remarkable feature of the 1999-2002 EP in terms of the distribu-
tion of voting power is the weakness of the PES: While holding about 29 
per cent of the seats in the EP, its share of voting power is just 19 per cent. 
In other words: the PES loses about 10 percentage points in terms of voting 
power, which is by far the biggest loss of voting power that a party group 
suffers. The picture for the EPP looks quite different: While holding about 
37 per cent of seats in the EP, its share of voting power (slightly) exceeds 
that, being close to 40 per cent for both periods. Concerning the medium-
sized groups (ELDR, GUE/NGL, Greens), we can observe similar tenden-
cies: All of them profit in terms of voting power relative to their share of 
seats. When looking at the UEN group, one can see that changes in the con-
figuration of players can induce considerable changes in the distribution of 
voting power. The UEN comprised about 28 MEPs on average in the first 
period (with the TGI still being a player), and it also had more voting 
power than one would expect based on its number of seats. However, after 
the disappearance of the TGI (and a drop in size to 22 MEPs), the group’s 
voting power went down to 3.57 per cent, almost matching its share of 
seats. (See Table 2 in the Annex) 
Hence, in a nutshell, we see that in a Parliament based on perfect atten-
dance and cohesion, the distribution of voting power does not follow the 
distribution of seats. Instead, some party groups (especially PES) suffer 
losses in terms of voting power, while others gain. However, as we have 
argued above, this picture is not very realistic, since it is based on the as-
sumption of perfect cohesion and attendance. Therefore, the next step of 
our analysis will include the differential levels of cohesion and attendance 
that characterize the party groups, thus yielding a more realistic picture of 
power in the EP. 
 
7  Since we assume perfect cohesion and attendance, there is no difference between votes taken under 
absolute majority rule and simple majority rule. 
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Power in the EP given the differential levels of cohesion 
and attendance 
Taking differential levels of cohesion and attendance into account is 
equivalent to reducing the number of seats for each party group with the 
extent of reduction depending on the level of cohesion and attendance. To 
include the effect of differential levels of cohesion, we have computed for 
each party group and each vote taken how the members of a party group 
were split between „Yea”, „Nay” and abstentions. We have then checked 
for each vote which one of the three sub-groups (Yea, Nay, abstentions) 
was the largest one and how many MEPs this largest sub-group comprised. 
Finally, we have calculated the mean of the size of the largest sub-group 
over all the votes we analyse, thus yielding the average size of the largest 
sub-group within each party group.
8  
We use this mean value as the size of the party group controlled for its 
level of cohesion.
9 Finally, taking into account the differential levels of at-
tendance is straightforward and easy: if only 50 per cent of a party group’s 
MEPs are present when a vote is taken, the size of this party group is re-
duced by half. But what are the consequences of the inclusion of differen-
tial levels of cohesion and attendance? We will first look at the situation 
under absolute majority rule. (See Tables 3 and 4 in the Annex) 
Only controlling for cohesion already yields some changes in the expected 
direction: The four party groups that act most cohesively gain in terms of 
voting power at the expense of the other party groups. The EPP’s share of 
power rises to 41.83 per cent (42.74 per cent) for the period including (ex-
cluding) the TGI compared to the situation analysed before. The PES also 
gains about two percentage points of power, but still has far less power 
 
8  This does not imply that these sub-groups and their composition within each party group are con-
stant. The composition can change on every single vote. What we calculate is an aggregate measure 
for the cohesion of party groups. We do not say anything about the lines along which a party group 
is split. 
9  To give an example: let us say a party group comprises 100 MEPs. On a certain vote, 80 of its MEPs 
vote „Yea”, 15 „Nay” and 5 abstain. Obviously, the largest sub-group votes „Yea” and comprises 80 
MEPs. On another vote, 30 MEPs vote „Yea”, 60 vote „Nay” and 10 abstain. In this case, the largest 
sub-group votes „Nay” and comprises 60 MEPs. In these two cases, we would take the mean of 80 
and 60 (i.e. 70) and treat the party group, which originally and actually comprises 100 MEPs as a 
party group that only comprises 70 MEPs. 
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than one would expect based on its share of seats. The liberals and the 
greens also obtain small gains of power, while the EDD – the party group 
with the lowest cohesion – suffers the biggest loss of power: its share of 
power is almost cut by half for the period including the TGI and even by 
more than two thirds for the period excluding the TGI, leaving the party 
group as hardly more than a dummy player. Other significant losses can be 
seen for GUE/NGL, TGI and UEN for the period including TGI as well as 
the Non-Attached and the UEN for the period excluding the TGI. 
However, all of these changes in the distribution of power are minor com-
pared to those that we observe when levels of attendance are controlled for. 
Of course, this does not come as a surprise, since we are dealing with votes 
taken under absolute majority rule (i.e. a threshold of 314 MEPs) and with 
a parliament, for which about 25 per cent of MEPs are not present on aver-
age. The consequence of these two factors combined is an almost exclusive 
concentration of power in the hands of the two largest party groups – EPP 
and PES – with hardly any power and differences remaining among all 
other party groups, their power is negligible. This is true for both periods 
analysed here. The EPP is still more powerful than the PES, it holds more 
than half of the power! 
This changes when we look at the last scenario: the distribution of power in 
the EP simultaneously controlled for cohesion and attendance. The two 
largest groups now possess the same share of power – both hold about 45 
per cent. Again there are hardly any differences among the other party 
groups, their share of power does not exceed three per cent. The only re-
markable feature is that the liberals and the greens – both very cohesive 
groups – manage to (re-)gain some power for the period including the TGI 
compared to the scenario when we only controlled for attendance. 
Taken together, we see that the distribution of power does change when 
one controls for cohesion and attendance. However, while we have seen the 
impact of differential levels of cohesion, we have not so much seen an ef-
fect of differential levels of attendance, but rather a general effect of low 
levels of attendance. Since we have only looked at votes taken under abso-
lute majority rule so far, the concentration of power in the hands of the two 
10   The Difference Between Real and Potential Power 
largest groups was primarily the result of the high threshold combined with 
the generally low presence. This will no longer be the case, when we look 
at votes taken under simple majority rule, where the level of attendance per 
se does not matter.
10 (See Tables 5 and 6 in the Annex) 
The general expectations (albeit with a few exceptions) are again met. 
Party groups with low levels of attendance – especially TGI and UEN (in 
the second period) – suffer losses of power. However, it is more interesting 
to finally look at the interactive effect of cohesion and attendance, where 
the results are more straightforward and also more relevant in magnitude. 
Party groups with disciplined and present MEPs gain (considerable) 
amounts of power at the expense of party groups with less disciplined and 
less present MEPs. UEN and TGI lose most in the first period: While start-
ing with a share of power of 5.40 and 3.25 per cent respectively, they end 
up with a share of only 2.90 and 1.47 per cent. Just about half of their 
power is left . The same applies to the non-attached members in the second 
period. On the other hand, EPP and PES gain about three percentage points 
of power in the first period, liberals and Greens about 1.5 percentage points 
(which is equivalent to a gain of about 10 per cent in relative terms!). Co-
hesion and attendance do matter – the more disciplined and cohesive MEPs 
act, the more powerful their party groups become. 
Summary 
We have shown that power index analyses that do not take into account dif-
ferential levels of attendance and cohesion yield results that are not neces-
sarily realistic. Most significantly, we see a shift of power towards the two 
large party groups, EPP and PES under absolute majority rule. We have 
shown that almost the entire amount of voting power is split between these 
groups. The other party groups are limited to being hardly more than dum-
mies. However, that was only partially an effect of differential levels of  
 
10  To do so, we have multiplied the average presence for each party group with its number of seats. 
Next, we have added up these ”present seats”. Doing so yields an EP with 457 (479) seats for period 
including (excluding) TGI. This is the average number of present MEPs. In order to obtain a thresh-
old for simple majority voting, this number is divided by two. 
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cohesion and attendance, and primarily an effect of the generally low level 
of attendance. Still it proves the point that power index analysis should take 
into account questions of cohesion and attendance. In the second step of 
our analysis, we have also shown that differential levels do matter – with 
cohesion being more consequential. 
What are the possible consequences of our findings? The concentration of 
power in the hands of the two larger party groups may well induce further 
centripetal moves in the Parliament, with MEPs motivated by legislative 
goals having strong incentives to switch to EPP or PES. At the same time, 
this means that the medium-sized and smaller groups are caught in a diffi-
cult situation. Possessing only marginal policy influence in comparison 
with the two largest groups probably contributes to lower attendance rates 
and cohesion levels, which in turn further marginalizes these groups in the 
chamber. Our results also indicate that all party groups, including PES and 
EPP, have an interest in ensuring that both their MEPs are present in the 
chamber when votes are taken and that they vote according to group lines, 
with particularly the low attendance levels reducing the ability of the 
groups to influence EU legislation, at least under absolute majority rule. 
Whether that is actually possible unilaterally or whether the other party 
groups would follow a move by one party group to increase cohesion 
and/or attendance, is another question for future analysis. 
12   The Difference Between Real and Potential Power 
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Annex 
Table 1:   The party groups in the present European Parliament (as 
of 1 July 2002) 
 
Abbrevia-
tion 
Name MEPs 
Coun-
tries 
EPP 
Group of the European People's Party 
(Christian Democrats) and European De-
mocrats 
234 15 
PES  Group of the Party of European Socialists  175  15 
ELDR 
Group of the European Liberal, Democrat 
and Reform Party 
52 10 
GUE/NGL 
Confederal Group of the European 
United Left/Nordic Green Left 
46 10 
Greens 
Group of the Greens/European Free Alli-
ance 
45 12 
UEN  Union for Europe of the Nations Group  22  5 
EDD 
Group for a Europe of Democracies and Di-
versities 
16 4 
TGI 
Technical Group of Independent Members –
mixed group 
0 0* 
NA  Non-Attached Members   36  6 
* After a ruling of the European Court of Justice, the TGI no longer exists. 
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Figure 1:   Cohesion in the EP by Party Group 
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Figure 2:   Attendance in the EP by Party Group 
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Table 2: Voting Power under absolute majority rule in present EP 
assuming perfect cohesion and attendance, based on (average) 
number of seats 
  Period including TGI  Period excluding TGI 
 Number 
of Seats 
Percentage 
of Seats 
Voting 
Power
Number 
of Seats
Percentage 
of Seats 
Voting 
Power
EDD 16,52  2,64 3,25  18,00  2,88 3,57 
ELDR  51,58  8,24 9,92  50,98  8,14 10,71 
EPP  232,23  37,10 38,97  232,92  37,21 39,76 
Greens  47,12  7,53 9,92  45,00  7,19 8,81 
GUE/NGL  42,00  6,71 8,49  43,00  6,87 8,81 
Non-
Attached 
9,85  1,57 1,11  33,00  5,27 5,48 
PES  180,18  28,78 19,68  181,00  28,91 19,29 
TGI 18,37  2,93  3,25       
UEN 27,74  4,43 5,40  22,00  3,51 3,57 
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Table 3:   Voting Power under absolute majority rule in present EP, 
based on (average) number of seats, controlling for differential lev-
els of cohesion and attendance (period including TGI) 
Voting Power controlling for…  
Number 
of Seats 
Percentage 
of Seats 
Voting 
Power 
in per-
fect 
EP 
Cohesion Attendance 
Cohesion 
and At-
tendance
EDD 16,52  2,64 3,25  1,83  2,18 0,56 
ELDR 51,58  8,24  9,92  10,87  2,18  2,94 
EPP 232,23  37,10  38,97  41,83  50,40  44,96 
Greens 47,12  7,53  9,92  9,92 2,18  2,94 
GUE/NGL 42,00  6,71  8,49  7,42  2,18  2,34 
Non-
Attached 
9,85 1,57  1,11  1,47  0,40  0,20 
PES 180,18  28,78  19,68  21,23  36,11  44,96 
TGI 18,37  2,93  3,25  2,18  2,18  0,56 
UEN 27,74  4,43 5,40  3,25  2,18 0,56 
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Table 4:   Voting Power under absolute majority rule in present EP, 
based on (average) number of seats, controlling for differential lev-
els of cohesion and attendance (period excluding TGI) 
Voting Power controlling for…  
Number 
of Seats 
Percentage 
of Seats 
Voting 
Power 
in per-
fect 
EP 
Cohesion Attendance 
Cohesion 
and At-
tendance
EDD 18,00  2,88  3,57  1,07  1,19 0,71 
ELDR 50,98  8,14  10,71  10,83  3,57  1,67 
EPP 232,92  37,21  39,76  42,74  53,57  46,43 
Greens 45,00  7,19  8,81  9,40  3,57  1,67 
GUE/NGL 43,00  6,87  8,81  8,69  3,57  1,67 
Non-
Attached 
33,00 5,27  5,48 2,74  1,19  0,71 
PES  181,00  28,91  19,29  21,79  32,14  46,43 
TGI             
UEN 22,00  3,51  3,57  2,74  1,19 0,71 
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Table 5:   Voting Power under simple majority rule in present EP, 
based on (average) number of seats, controlling for differential lev-
els of cohesion and attendance (period including TGI) 
Voting Power con-
trolling for… 
  Number 
of Seats 
Percentage 
of Seats 
Voting 
Power 
in per-
fect EP Attendance
Cohesion 
and 
Atten-
dan 1,83  ce  EDD 16,52  2,64  3,25  3,02 
ELDR 51,58  8,24 9,92  10,75  11,23 
EPP 232,23  37,10  38,97  38,02  41,11 
Greens 47,12  7,53 9,92  10,04 10,87 
GUE/NGL 42,00 6,71  8,49 8,25  7,66 
Non-
Attached 
9,85 1,57  1,11  1,59  0,75 
PES 180,18  28,78  19,68  20,52  22,18 
TGI 18,37  2,93  3,25  2,30  1,47 
UEN 27,74  4,43  5,40  5,52  2,90 
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Table 6:   Voting Power under simple majority rule in present EP, 
based on (average) number of seats, controlling for differential lev-
els of cohesion and attendance (period excluding TGI) 
Voting Power con-
trolling for… 
  Number 
of Seats 
Percentage 
of Seats 
Voting 
Power 
in per-
fect EP Attendance
Cohesion 
and At-
tendance 
EDD 18,00  2,88  3,57  2,86  2,02 
ELDR 50,98  8,14 10,71  11,43  11,79 
EPP 232,92  37,21  39,76  39,05  40,36 
Greens 45,00  7,19 8,81  9,52  10,36 
GUE/NGL 43,00 6,87  8,81 8,10  7,26 
Non-
Attached 
33,00 5,27  5,48 6,19  2,74 
PES  181,00  28,91  19,29  20,00  22,74 
TGI           
UEN 22,00  3,51  3,57  2,86  2,74 
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